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ESSAY: SOVEREIGN SYNDICATED BANK 
CREDITS IN THE 1970S 
PHILIP R. WOOD* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay reviews the development of the documentation of bank-
syndicated credit agreements with sovereign states and state entities during the 
formative years of the 1970s. One of the main objectives of this review is to 
examine the impact that the documentation had upon the resolution of 
sovereign insolvencies in the lost decade of the 1980s. 
This essay is based on the direct recollection of a number of practitioners in 
London who had worked on syndicated credit documentation with sovereign 
states during the 1970s.1 
Most of the documentation was and still is confidential, and we therefore do 
not refer to particular transactions. Rather, our objective is to preserve the 
participants’ memories of the events, as primary sources. Historians who may 
subsequently authenticate this record can of course do so in subsequent years 
by consulting the archives, to the extent they still exist. Regrettably, many of the 
original loan documents have probably by now been destroyed. On the other 
hand, they were quite repetitive and the contributors to this paper believe that 
the record set out below is a reasonable reflection of what the documents 
actually said. 
We do not review the practice for bond issues. Bond issues in the 1970s were 
made almost exclusively by advanced sovereign states with an impeccable credit 
rating, as opposed to countries that subsequently became insolvent. The bond 
market was not prepared to invest in issues by what are now called “emerging 
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countries,” then called “lesser-developed countries.” The international bond 
market for emerging countries only really opened in the 1990s. 
One of the origins of the Eurodollar market based in London was an 
American interest equalization tax which effectively imposed a withholding tax 
on loans out of the United States. Bank loan agreements were favored, 
particularly after the abundance of petro-dollar deposits in banks after the oil 
price hike in 1973. The bond market was also discouraged by problems with the 
extra-territorial impact of U.S. securities laws and perhaps the relative 
cheapness of bank syndication fees compared to the fees for bond issues. 
The sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s was effectively started by the failure 
of Poland in 1980. At the time, the market considered this to be a one-off event 
that was attributable to the political situation of Poland. The series of defaults 
proper commenced with the defaults of Costa Rica and, four weeks later, of 
Mexico in August 1982. By the end of the decade, practically every single 
emerging country in the world that had foreign borrowings had gone through a 
rescheduling with its banks, with the exception of Russia and China. 
II 
ORIGIN OF THE DOCUMENTATION 
The documentation for syndicated credits was largely based on American 
forms, presumably developed during the 1930s and before. 
It is possible that the first English–law-syndicated Eurodollar loan 
agreement in London was entered into on April 10, 1968. The borrower was 
Standard Bank and the agent bank was Mitsui Trust. The document was drafted 
by Hugh Pigott of Coward Chance from scratch and without reference to 
existing U.S. precedents. We do not know whether or not there was an earlier 
example, now lost, but at any rate, loan agreements began to proliferate in 1969 
and 1970. Standard forms were in being by 1979 and were printed by external 
printers—which showed early attempts at commoditization.2 
There were probably two main reasons for these multi-bank loans 
encapsulated in a single agreement in the United States. One was the tradition 
of small unit banks in the United States stemming from legislation, based upon 
the fear of all-powerful banks, which prohibited the establishment of branches 
of a bank from one state in other states. Hence, a large loan might require many 
banks to be assembled to provide it under a single agreement. The other 
possible reason was that the United States had developed the largest economy 
in the world, so that the crude volumes of finance required for projects and for 
enterprise may have been larger than elsewhere, thereby necessitating a spread 
of the risk among several banks. 
 
 2. The first agreements were very short—maybe ten to twenty pages. They are now over 100 
pages. 
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III 
MANDATE AND THE ARRANGING BANK 
The process of syndication was then not greatly different from what it is 
now, that is, the prospective borrower would appoint a bank, or in the case of a 
large loan a group of banks, to arrange the syndication. The financial terms of 
the loan would be set out in a mandate letter or term sheet, which stated the 
amount, term, repayment schedule, interest margin, fees, any special terms, and 
a general statement that the loan agreement would contain representations and 
warranties, covenants, events of default, and other usual clauses. 
Unlike some modern practices, particularly in relation to acquisition loans, 
the mandate letter would almost invariably never be legally binding, and there 
would be a statement to that effect or a statement that it was “subject to 
contract.” The current common conditions, such as there being no material 
adverse change in the syndication markets or the sovereign state’s financial 
condition, no concurrent syndication by the sovereign state, and the like, were 
not typical at the time. In particular, there were no “market flex” clauses that 
allowed the arrangers to change the price, structure, or term of the facility prior 
to signing if there were a change in the prevailing conditions in the international 
financial markets. 
The functions of the arranging bank were to assist the borrower in preparing 
an information memorandum about the borrower and the loan for dispatch to 
potential participants, to solicit expressions of interest from the banks, and to 
negotiate the loan documentation. The club of available banks was quite small, 
initially dominated by U.S. and Canadian banks, and later joined by consortium 
and Japanese banks. 
IV 
SYNDICATION PRINCIPLES 
The main syndication principles built into the documentation were set in 
this period and still continue to be followed. 
1. Several commitments: each bank agreed in the loan agreement to 
make a separate loan to the borrower up to its date of commitment. 
The commitments were several: then, as now, the banks did not 
underwrite each other. Contributions to loans were made by the banks 
in proportion to their commitments, and payments by the borrower 
were, generally speaking, divided between the banks in the same 
proportion. However, all the loans were made on precisely the same 
terms. The agent bank did not undertake to make up the defaults of 
any defaulting bank, and this still continues to be practice. 
From time to time there were defaults by participating banks, for 
example, the failure of the Franklin National Bank in the United 
States in 1974, an event that influenced further adjustments to the 
form of loan agreement, which anticipated the failure of Lehman 
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Brothers in 2008. Even prior to that, there were a very large number 
of bank failures over the years. 
2. Agent bank: for administrative convenience, one of the banks was 
appointed agent of the syndicate through which payments and 
communications were channeled. The agent bank was, and still is, 
agent of the banks, not of the borrower. This is unlike the fiscal agent 
for a bond issue where the fiscal agent is the agent of the issuer. One 
consequence is that if the fiscal agent becomes insolvent after having 
put in funds by the issuer, the issuer has to pay again. In syndications, 
on the other hand, payments by the borrower to the agent bank 
discharge the borrower. 
3. Syndicate democracy: the banks typically agreed to delegate limited 
decisions to majority control. 
4. Pro rata sharing: the banks typically agreed to a degree of 
communality by virtue of a pro rata sharing clause designed to ensure 
that receipts by syndicate members were shared proportionately 
without discrimination. 
All of these clauses are reviewed in more detail below. 
V 
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 
The arranging bank that was mandated to arrange the syndication would 
approach other banks in the market to see whether they would be willing to 
participate. Common practice was for banks who expressed interest to be sent 
an information memorandum giving financial and other information about the 
borrower, which had been prepared in conjunction with the borrower by the 
arranging bank. 
This information memorandum generally contained (1) the term sheet 
giving details of the loan and (2) details of the sovereign state’s economy and 
government. The memorandum was typically an extremely short document 
since it was assumed that potential participating banks would have access to 
their own credit information about the prospective borrower. It was perhaps 
also considered that there was a large element of political decision in making a 
loan to a sovereign state, based on the common, but wrongly held view that 
states never become bankrupt. 
Then, as now, it was assumed that this information memorandum did not 
attract the regulation of prospectuses for public issues of securities. The reasons 
were variously that the circular was private, that loans were not securities within 
the securities legislation, or that the persons to whom the circular was sent were 
sophisticated investors within an applicable exemption. In any event, it was 
assumed that the documents did not have to meet the factual standards of 
public prospectuses or attract the sharpened and enhanced remedies available 
to investors if a public prospectus should turn out to be misleading. 
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It therefore came as a considerable shock later in the 1970s when 
consortium bank UBAF Ltd. commenced an action in the English courts 
against another consortium bank, European-American Banking Corp. (EABC), 
whereby UBAF alleged that EABC had invited UBAF to participate in an 
existing shipping loan to the Greek Colocotronis Group on the basis of 
incorrect statements.3 At the time, it was said that the Colocotronis Group was 
in dire financial straits, but this was allegedly not revealed by EABC. The case 
was subsequently settled, but the lower court suggested in 1984 that the lending 
bank had fiduciary duties of care to the proposed participant. 
At the time, the writer recalls that a banker enquired, “Is this a new law? Is 
it correct that we are no longer permitted to, well, make the loan sound better 
than it really is in order to get the deal done?” 
The writer responded, “This is not a new law. In fact, it is an old law, a very 
old law. There is a law against lies which has been around for quite a bit. It was 
proposed by a burning bush in antique times.” 
The immediate impact of the UBAF action was twofold. First, the arranging 
bank’s then customarily very short disclaimer in the information memorandum 
for the contents of that memorandum was substantially and comprehensively 
extended so as to exclude all liability. Lawyers wrote anxious memoranda on 
the law relating to contract misrepresentation and exclusion clauses. Secondly, 
the agency clause in the credit agreement almost tripled in length by the 
insertion of elaborate exclusions of liability for the benefit of the agent bank 
and an insistence that the agent bank had only ministerial or administrative 
duties and no fiduciary discretions. 
While there may have been litigation by disappointed syndicate banks 
against arranging banks in the 1980s for misselling, particularly in the United 
States, we suspect that little of this was prosecuted successfully to verdict. 
VI 
PARTIES TO SOVEREIGN SYNDICATED BANK CREDITS 
The parties to the syndicated credit were (1) the borrower; (2) the arranging 
bank, mainly to benefit from the exclusions from liability; (3) the lending banks; 
and (4) the agent bank. 
Typically, in the case of many emerging countries, the borrower was the 
central bank under the guarantee of the state itself. One purpose of making the 
central bank the borrower was that many of the facilities were effectively 
balance-of-payments facilities and, therefore, should have been under the 
control of the central bank. More importantly, from the point of view of the 
banks, the fact that the central bank was the obligor meant that any foreign 
reserves held by the central bank would be potentially available to the banks in 
the event of a default. 
 
 3. See UBAF Ltd. v. European American Banking Corp., [1984] 1 Q.B. 713. 
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The banks were therefore considerably more hard-headed in their approach 
than subsequent bond investors: bond issues by emerging countries from the 
1990s onward were almost invariably issued by the sovereign state itself without 
any involvement of the central bank so that in most cases central bank foreign 
reserves were insulated from attachment by unpaid bondholders. The 
bargaining power or leverage that these later bondholders could therefore 
exercise over a sovereign state was very much less. 
The technical exposure of central bank foreign reserves proved to be less of 
a problem for rescheduling negotiations in the 1980s than in later years in 
relation to disgruntled bond investors. While foreign reserves may well have 
been substantially run down by insolvent states, the main reason for this 
outcome was probably that international banks considered themselves to be a 
club, a club whose rules required an adhesion to various values of restraint, 
propriety, and discipline. This club-like view was reinforced by the close links 
between the large international banks and their central banks: the commercial 
banks were probably much more susceptible to suggestions from the central 
bank as to how they should conduct themselves. The fact that hedge funds and 
the like had not been heard of to any significant extent and certainly did not 
participate in the syndicated loans meant that on the whole, the problem of the 
“hold-out creditor” was much less than it is now. 
VII 
GOVERNING LAW AND JURISDICTION 
Governing law and jurisdiction were a major preoccupation at the time. 
Probably by far the largest number of these sovereign international loan 
agreements were governed by English law, with the submission by the borrower 
to the jurisdiction of the English courts. One reason that English law was 
chosen was that the new interbank-deposit funding market was located in 
London. 
From the point of view of the banks, it was considered crucial to have an 
external governing law. The prime reason for this was that the governing law 
insulated the contract from exchange controls, moratoriums, and other 
interferences with the borrower’s obligations by legislation in the borrower’s 
jurisdiction. This was well-settled by English case law. Another reason is that 
the banks sought a governing law that they considered conferred stability and 
predictability. For example, the banks wished to be sure that if, say, an event of 
default clause stated that if an event of default occurred, the banks could 
immediately accelerate the loans, then this action would be upheld by the 
courts. English lawyers were able to confirm that this was the case, but in a 
celebrated tour of continental Europe carried out in the 1970s by a major 
American bank and their lawyers, it was reported that other jurisdictions in 
continental Europe would not be able to say the same. 
Other factors that influenced the choice of law were non-legal preferences, 
such as tradition, familiarity, and convenience; the avoidance by the lender of 
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the detailed investigation into an unfamiliar system of law; and an ability to use 
lawyers who had a special experience in the type of financial contract 
concerned; as well as language. One suspects that Anglo-American affinities 
played a part. 
Various unfounded prejudices might also have been influential. Some 
English lawyers thought that under English law, an agreement could freely say 
what it liked, but civil code systems were despotic. There may have been some 
truth in this as regards to such matters as good faith contracts, fine-trigger 
accelerations, and literal interpretation. They also thought that under English 
law, you had to write it all down, otherwise it did not exist. This notion seemed 
to have been derived from the prevailing view among, for example, French 
lawyers that the code filled in everything that was missing, a point that caused 
some surprise by those lawyers who drafted increased costs and market 
disruption clauses. If any French lawyer did say that at the time, the statement 
was not substantiated by the reality, although there might have been a greater 
tendency for civil law courts to rectify agreements and fill them in if the parties 
must clearly have intended what was missing. In any event, nowadays all those 
old theological battles are past, although individual legal systems do put a 
different emphasis upon literal interpretation, good faith performance, 
predictability, and rectification of contracts. 
Once the governing law had been chosen, jurisdiction followed suit since the 
benefits of an external governing law might well be lost if the courts that 
enforced it were different, even though technically most courts could then, as 
now, apply foreign law. 
Initially the borrower submitted only to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the 
English courts, but later in the decade there was typically also submission to the 
Federal courts sitting in New York. This reflected the importance of American 
banks in the syndicated loans. 
Another factor was whether or not the courts would apply the chosen 
system of law: England had case law going back to 1865 which affirmed the 
situation. The predictability of the choice of governing law probably stemmed 
in England from the dominance of British shipping in the 19th century, where 
typically charter-parties would be governed by English law, even though the 
charter-party had no relation at all to England and could be between parties in 
some distant part of the British Empire. 
Similarly, there had to be certainty that the courts would accept the 
submission to jurisdiction. Fortunately for London, there was a European 
convention of 1968 on judgments in civil and commercial matters, which had a 
special, though grudging, article sanctifying the choice of law in international 
contracts. 
It was typical in the jurisdiction clause for the borrower to appoint an agent 
in England for service and process. Very often, this was the sovereign state’s 
ambassador to the United Kingdom at the Court of St. James. We have never 
heard of an ambassador actually being served. 
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In the early days of the Eurodollar market, a number of emerging countries, 
especially those in Latin America, expressed strong opposition to foreign 
governing law and submission to foreign courts. In some cases, notably Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Colombia, negotiators argued that there were provisions in 
their constitutions that prohibited a submission to foreign courts, provisions 
that were based on the Calvo doctrine, developed by an Argentinean statesman 
after the gun-boat diplomacy of European powers in the 19th century. This was 
intended in part to enforce payment of debts by Latin American states to the 
nationals of the European countries concerned. Almost invariably, banks 
refused to lend under local law. 
The banks were not usually prepared to accept arbitration as an alternative 
to foreign courts. Arbitration was seen as indicating a lack of commitment in 
principle. Various technical reasons were advanced, for example, that expert 
adjudication was not required, that arbitration was a condition precedent to 
enforcement, that the procedure was looser and less predictable, that there 
might be jurisdictional disputes, that arbitration would give rise to expense and 
delay, and so on. Ultimately there was a strong prejudice against this method of 
resolving disputes on the fundamental ground that, if there were a default, there 
really would be nothing to arbitrate, and that anything that was an obstacle to 
the right to direct enforcement would be seen as weakening the bargaining 
position of the banks. 
Some banks did give into the arbitration saga, and lengthy arbitration 
clauses in favor of London were introduced for Brazil and Venezuela. Possibly 
one of the earliest arbitration clauses was around 1972 in favor of Minas Gerais. 
Arbitration clauses fell into desuetude when a U.S. lawyer pointed out to 
Venezuela that the presence of a constitutional objection to arbitration would 
result in Venezuela being excluded from U.S. credit markets. 
Suggestions that a loan agreement should be made subject to a public 
international law instead of a municipal system of law were uniformly rejected. 
The banks considered public international law to be too vague and 
unpredictable compared to a hard-edged system of law such as English law. 
The idea of a floating law was toyed with in Mexican negotiations but not 
adopted, so far as we could see. 
VIII 
WAIVERS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
The agreements invariably contained an express waiver of sovereign 
immunity by the borrower. Thus, the borrower would waive immunity from 
jurisdiction, immunity from pre-judgment proceedings, and immunity from 
enforcement. 
At first, these waivers of immunity were more hope than anything else, but 
in 1976, waivers of immunity were validated in the United States by the 
Sovereign Foreign Immunities Act of 1976 and in the United Kingdom by the 
State Immunity Act 1978. 
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In the 1980s, there were indeed some actions by banks against sovereign 
states, but on the whole these were isolated. Instead, the impact of the waivers 
of sovereign immunity was mainly to strengthen the bargaining position of 
banks in the event of a sovereign state default since strictly, the foreign reserves 
of central banks were exposed to creditor attachments. 
IX 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS BORROWERS 
From time to time, international organizations were the borrowers under 
these syndicated credits. International organizations are entities created by 
treaty between sovereign states. 
In 1977, a proposed loan to the Comecon bank, the International Bank for 
Economic Corp., was brought into doubt on the ground that there were said to 
be legal problems in the recognition of an international organization on the 
theory that international organizations were like sovereign states. Under then-
prevailing theory in the United Kingdom and the United States, the courts 
would not recognize a sovereign state unless the court was advised by the 
authorities that they did indeed recognize the state concerned. The law firm 
acting for the lenders on this particular occasion referenced a famous Oxford 
public international law professor who opined that the English courts would not 
recognize the international organization unless the Foreign Office had 
confirmed to the court that the United Kingdom recognized the organization. 
Banks had been used to lending to sovereign states on the basis that, by reason 
of sovereign immunity, they might not be able to enforce their loans, but 
lending to a ghost was an entirely different matter. 
Subsequently, an equally eminent Cambridge international law professor 
delivered a contrary opinion. To resolve these doubts, there was an exchange of 
correspondence between the Bank of England and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in May 1978, in which the Minister for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs stated that an organization set up by foreign states by 
treaty, which had legal personality in states outside the United Kingdom, would 
enjoy legal personality and capacity in this country without any formal 
statement by or on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, in the same way, and 
to the same extent as any other banking, commercial, or other trading 
organization established in a country other than the United Kingdom and 
enjoying legal personality in that country. There were also other reassuring 
statements. 
X 
DRAWDOWN OF LOANS AND CONDITIONS PRECEDENT 
Typically, drawdowns of loans were permitted during a commitment period 
of, say, six months. Drawdowns would usually be made in a single amount or in 
rounded amounts. There were detailed mechanics for the giving of notice of 
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drawdown to the agent bank who would then advise the banks. Typically, five 
business days’ notice of drawdown was required. In practice, many of the loans 
were drawn down in a single amount. Revolving loans were unusual. 
Loan agreements provided, as they do now, that the banks were not obliged 
to lend unless certain conditions were satisfied—the conditions precedent. 
These were not conditions to the coming into force of the agreement since the 
agreement came into force on signature. They were conditions to lending. First 
there were conditions precedent to all loans designed to ensure that all legal 
matters were in order. The clause provided an outline that the banks were not 
obliged to make any loans unless the agent had received in form and substance 
satisfactory to it the constitutional documents of the borrower, the necessary 
governmental authorizations, any official consents, a process agency 
appointment under the forum selection clause, certificates as to compliance, and 
formal legal opinions. 
At first, English lawyers were very reluctant to adopt the U.S. habit of 
formal transaction legal opinions because they could not see the point at which 
the lawyers were already professionally engaged: the legal opinions seemed to 
be mainly a vehicle for excluding responsibility. Still, the market wanted these 
ceremonial documents. Legal opinions became longer and longer, filled out 
with more and more qualifications, many of them trivial, with the result that a 
recipient must have thought that everything was wrong with the document and 
nothing right. 
Then there were conditions precedent to each loan separately. The clause 
provided in outline that no bank was obliged to make a loan unless the 
representations and warranties were true on an updated basis and that no event 
of default or potential event of default had occurred. 
It was not usually a condition precedent that there had been no material 
adverse change in the financial condition of the borrower. However, a material 
adverse change event of default was common with the result that the condition 
that there be no default had the effect of introducing this provision as a 
condition precedent to lending. 
In practice, the ability of banks to suspend new loans when the borrower’s 
financial condition is deteriorating by virtue of a material adverse change clause 
can be important. Material adverse change clauses have often been used in the 
corporate sector to suspend new loans which could involve throwing good 
money after bad. It is a matter of conjecture how often these clauses were 
implemented during the less-developed-country (LDC) crisis in the 1980s, but it 
is thought that the need to implement them must have been rare. 
XI 
APPLICATION OF PROCEEDS 
In most cases, the clause providing for the application of the proceeds was in 
generic and vague terms, for example, the proceeds would be used for balance 
of payments purposes or some such statement. U.S. banks insisted on this 
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clause, perhaps to show compliance with Trading with the Enemy legislation 
and embargos. The clause invariably stated that the banks were not to be 
concerned with establishing the proper use of proceeds, so it was really a 
formality—a point dramatically brought out by the famous 1070s Italian loan to 
save Venice, which inexplicably was not used wholly for that noble objective. 
XII 
REPAYMENT 
The typical repayment terms were a grace period of six months or a year 
followed by semi-annual equal repayments. Occasionally repayment was in a 
single amount—a “bullet” loan. 
XIII 
PREPAYMENTS 
Almost invariably, the borrower was permitted to prepay, but only at the 
end of interest periods (to avoid breakage costs on funding deposits), and to 
cancel the commitments at any time. Prepayments were in minimum and 
rounded amounts and were applied to repayment installments in inverse order 
of maturity so as to shorten the life of the loan. Prepayments were made pro 
rata to the banks. The only circumstances in which the borrower would be 
permitted to pay a bank individually without prepaying the others would occur 
in the event of a prepayment on a tax gross-up, in the event of an imposition of 
increased regulatory costs, or in the event of illegality. 
XIV 
INTEREST 
Interest was invariably fixed as a percentage margin, for example, one 
percent, over the London interbank offered rate, which was usually determined 
as the average rate between three of the banks as reference banks. The fixing 
was at 11 a.m. London time in the interbank market, two business days before 
the interest period concerned. 
The borrower could generally choose interest periods of one, three, or six 
months, and sometimes nine or twelve months. 
Interest was calculated on a 360-day year basis for U.S. dollars (the usual 
currency) and was payable at the end of the interest periods and at least six 
monthly periods. 
Default interest was generally charged at one percent plus the normal 
margin, plus the higher of the existing rate and the new London interbank 
offered rate. Default interest was capitalized. This led to a huge burden of 
interest on defaulted sovereign loans. 
The interest rate was not provided by a rate provider via a screen service, as 
is now customary. There were no margin ratchets uplifting the interest rate 
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according to a drop in the ratings of the borrower. Fixed-rate interest loans 
appear to have been rare. 
XV 
MARKET DISRUPTION CLAUSE 
The London Interbank Eurodollar market was only a few years old, and 
therefore banks considered that it might be vulnerable to disappearance. A 
clause accordingly provided that, if a percentage of the banks determined that 
funding deposits were not readily available in the London Interbank Eurodollar 
market, then further drawdowns were suspended and the banks could call for a 
mandatory prepayment of existing loans and a cancellation of the commitments, 
with interest at a rate certified by each bank concerned or the reference banks, 
unless an alternative interest basis was otherwise agreed during a negotiation 
period, of typically thirty days. 
The current version of the clause now provides that the banks and the 
borrower are locked in without a compulsory prepayment, although banks still 
have the right to determine the new interest basis: this must be on the basis of 
funding costs from some other source that is reasonably selected. 
Evidently, the use of the clause has been extremely rare, although it has 
been used at least once in relation to a very small currency during the first Gulf 
War (the Kuwaiti dinar momentarily disappeared). It was also reported to have 
been used during the credit crunch of 2007 to 2009. 
XVI 
MULTICURRENCY OPTION 
Most loans were in U.S. dollars. In many of the loans, the borrower was 
given the option to select the currency of the loan and to switch currencies at 
the beginning of interest periods. The new currency had to be readily available 
in the funding market and freely convertible, or else require a unanimous 
approval by the banks. There would be a limit on the number of currencies 
outstanding at any one time. 
The amount of the new currency was calculated by reference to the spot rate 
of exchange between the base currency (usually U.S. dollars) and the new 
currency two business days before the next interest period. The borrower had to 
repay the old currency at the end of each interest period so that the currency 
amounts were adjusted every few months. Hence, the conversion involved 
actual advances and re-advances. 
The object of the multicurrency option was that the interest rate in one 
currency might be cheaper than in another. Balanced against this was the 
possibility that the borrower would be undertaking a currency risk. 
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XVII 
TAXES 
It was invariably provided that the borrower must pay without any 
deductions or set-offs and that if the borrower had to deduct taxes, then the 
borrower would pay extra so that the bank received the full amount. 
The exclusion of the right of set-offs meant that sovereign borrowers had to 
pay their loans in full notwithstanding that they were owed deposits by a 
lending bank. The object of this was partly “pay now, litigate later” and partly 
that the exercise of set-offs would interfere with the easy pro rata distribution of 
the proceeds of repayment by the agent bank to the participating syndicate. 
If taxes had to be deducted, then invariably the clause provided that the 
borrower would gross up payments. In practice, the state was unlikely to impose 
or withhold any tax on payments by itself or by its central bank. 
The clause typically applied only to taxes of the state concerned or of any 
federation of which it may be a member, although sometimes it did extend to 
tax deductions on payments elsewhere or even on payments by an agent bank 
to syndicate members (this was not a deduction by the borrower). 
XVIII 
INCREASED COSTS 
This clause provided in outline that if any law or regulation or official 
directive increased a participating bank’s underlying costs, the borrower would 
have to compensate that bank as certified by the bank concerned. The clause 
was mainly aimed at central bank reserve requirements, whereby typically a 
funding deposit borrowed by a syndicate member in the market would attract a 
central bank requirement to deposit a percentage of that deposit, for example, 
ten percent, with the central bank at a nil interest rate. The effect was that the 
cost of funds to the syndicate member would not be just the cost of the funding 
deposit, but also the cost of providing a reserve deposit to the central bank. 
Since the loan was based solely on cost of funds, this risk was a risk of the 
borrower, although the borrower was entitled to prepay the bank concerned. 
Very often, the clause was limited merely to changes in law. 
Although these clauses have been present from the earliest days of 
syndicate documentation in the Eurodollar market, it is believed that they have 
very rarely been implemented, except for domestic loans in the domestic 
currency. 
XIX 
ILLEGALITY CLAUSE 
This clause provided that if it became illegal for a bank to make a loan, to 
fund a loan in the market as contemplated, or to have the loan outstanding, the 
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bank concerned could cancel its commitment and the borrower had to prepay 
that bank individually. 
The clause appears to have originated in the United States in the 1930s and 
may have been ignited by Trading with the Enemy legislation. The fear was that 
a bank may be prohibited by an embargo in one jurisdiction, for example, the 
country of its head office, from continuing a loan, but be contractually obliged 
to lend under the governing law of the contract resulting in a limping contract. 
So the clause was a protection against Trading with the Enemy legislation, 
freeze orders, and blocking orders. 
The clause still survives as a standard in syndicate credit documentation, 
although it is thought that it has only rarely been used. The contributors do not 
recall an example. 
XX 
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
Credit agreements normally contained an elaborate series of representations 
and warranties by the borrower. 
These were divided into legal warranties, for example, the powers and 
authorizations of the borrower, due execution by the borrower, the obtaining of 
all consents, the completion of all necessary filings and registrations, 
non-conflict with laws or the borrower’s constitution or its contract, the legal 
validity and enforceability of the borrower’s obligations, the pari passu ranking 
of loans with other unsecured debt, the validity and admissibility of the 
agreements into evidence, and the validity of the choice of law and jurisdiction. 
The borrower would also typically warrant that its financial condition was as 
stated and that the information memorandum was materially correct and not 
misleading. It might also warrant there were no material defaults on its other 
debt. 
Early on, clauses were introduced to ensure that the representation and 
warranties remained true throughout the life of the loan, so that they were said 
to be “evergreen.” Sometimes the repetition only applied at the beginning of 
interest periods, but it always applied in relation to the conditions precedent for 
new drawdowns. 
Although a great deal of time and negotiation went into these 
representations and warranties, it is thought that the cancellation or 
acceleration of a loan on the ground of a breach of one of these representations 
and warranties was very rare in this period. Most of the statements were 
extremely bland. 
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XXI 
COVENANTS 
Generally there are only three covenants—(1) an obligation of the borrower 
to supply information reasonably requested by the agent or any bank, plus 
compliance certificates, (2) a pari passu clause, and (3) a negative pledge. 
XXII 
PARI PASSU CLAUSE 
The pari passu clause has been standard from the inception of Eurodollar 
documentation. It then provided, as it still does, that the borrower’s obligations 
are its direct and unconditional obligations and will rank pari passu with all its 
other unsecured liabilities. 
Although this clause later gave rise to litigation and controversy, it was, so 
far as we were aware, assumed at the time that the clause merely provided for 
the legal ranking of debt. It did not prevent the borrower from, in fact, 
preferring one creditor over another at a time when it was insolvent. The clause 
may have originated from the legal subordination or priority of some creditors, 
legal discrimination (for example, gold clauses), and the allocation of particular 
revenues of a state in the early days of sovereign lending in the 19th and early 
20th centuries. 
XXIII 
NEGATIVE PLEDGES 
The negative pledge was regarded as one of the most fundamentally 
important covenants in the loan agreement. The clause provided in outline that 
the borrower would not create or permit to subsist any security interest on any 
of its assets. 
The purpose of the clause was to ensure that the borrower did not create 
security in favor of one creditor over the unsecured creditors and thereby, 
allocate assets and revenues to a secured creditor. In practice, borrowers tend 
to create security when they are in financial difficulties when they are only able 
to borrow from secured creditors. This is the very time that other lenders wish 
to ensure that they are not discriminated against. The negative pledge therefore 
enhances equality between creditors. It also operates as an indirect control on 
the incurring of excessive liabilities. 
It was almost invariably the case that the loans were unsecured and 
therefore, had to be protected by a negative pledge. 
Normally, the negative pledge in sovereign loans applied only to external 
debt, defined as debt which was payable or optionally payable in or calculated 
by reference to any foreign currency or owed to non-residents. This limitation 
was generally acceptable to banks since governments were not normally 
disposed to charge their assets to secured domestic currency obligations. 
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Many of the agreements, particularly in the later years, extended the 
meaning of mortgages, charges, pledges, and the like to include title finance or 
quasi-security transactions, which had the commercial effect of security but 
were not security in legal form (for example, sale and lease-back, financial 
leasing, hire purchase, title retention, and sale and repurchase). Some sought to 
prohibit contractual set-off arrangements, notably following attempts in the 
mid-seventies by sovereign borrowers to set up commodity proceeds accounts 
eligible for a set-off against loans advanced by international banks, for example, 
Zaire. 
It was typical to permit security with majority bank consent, to permit liens 
arising by operation of law, and sometimes to permit security if the banks were 
equally and ratably secured. 
There was typically also an automatic security clause, which provided that, if 
the borrower created a violating security, then the banks were deemed 
automatically secured equally and ratably on the same asset as was mortgaged 
to the other creditor. There were half-hearted debates about the efficacy of this 
automatic security clause. 
For borrowers of low credit standing, the negative pledge sometimes also 
applied to public entities that were majority-owned by the state, whether or not 
they were administrative. 
The degree to which the clause was violated will perhaps never be known. 
But there were instances where sovereign states in financial difficulties did 
attempt to create non-violating security in return for fresh advances. Inevitably, 
this security had to be over foreign reserves, such as gold, deposits of foreign 
currency, or commodity revenues. 
From time to time, these efforts were successful, especially when the 
negative pledge did not prohibit transactions having the commercial effect of a 
core security interest. Examples were set-offs of commodity accounts. 
The real significance of the clause is debatable since, for many sovereign 
states that became insolvent, the amounts involved were so enormous that there 
was no question of these states having sufficient reserves to secure the creditors. 
Instead, in the case of state insolvency, there is by consensus an agreed 
bankruptcy ladder of priorities without the intervention of security interests. 
In a few sovereign and municipal loans, there was a statement that the loan 
was charged on the general assets or reserves of the borrower or on its 
consolidated fund. This practice from the 1930s was by no means common and 
has now fallen out of use. 
XXIV 
EVENTS OF DEFAULT 
The events of default commonly had four main effects by the express terms 
of the loan contract: 
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1. an event expressly permitted the banks to accelerate the 
outstanding loan; 
2. an event expressly permitted the banks to cancel their 
commitments to lend further loans; 
3. an event expressly enabled the banks to suspend further loans 
under the conditions precedent clause; and 
4. an event could constitute a default under other credit agreements 
for the borrower under a cross-default clause. 
Apart from non-payment, most of the events of default were early warning 
signs or anticipatory—a warning light. 
In practice, calling a default was a last resort. The ability to call a default 
was primarily to provide a sanction, to confer a vote on debt capital, and to 
strengthen the hand of the banks in restructuring negotiations. 
The main events of default were non-payment in the required currency and 
funds at the required place (often with a grace period of two to five business 
days); a breach of other obligations (often with a grace period of thirty days 
after written notice of default); a breach of representation or warranty; a cross-
default; execution, attachment, or other creditor processes against the 
borrower’s assets; and sometimes, steps being taken to reschedule debt or the 
stopping of foreign currency payments. 
There would sometimes be a material adverse change clause, where the 
borrower was an emerging country. A material adverse change clause replaced 
the typical corporate events of default such as actual or declared insolvency. 
The usual formulation was based broadly on World Bank practice. 
The cross-default was then regarded as a leading anticipatory event of 
default. It provided that if the borrower failed to pay other loans or guarantees 
when due, or if other loans were accelerated, then this would be an event of 
default. The thinking was that if the borrower defaulted on another loan, it was 
only a matter of time before the borrower defaulted on this loan; it therefore, 
established equality in the race to the courthouse door and non-discriminatory 
treatment. 
The clause was not usually extended to cover mere breaches of other loan 
agreements without there being a non-payment or acceleration. Such a 
provision would have allowed creditors to piggy-back onto the tightest of 
covenants in other loan agreements. 
The cross-default clause typically only applied to external debt, defined in 
the same way as in relation to negative pledges (see above). 
For very weak borrowers, the relevant events of default often also extended 
to public entities. It was also common to include an event of default if the 
government ceased to be a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
if the government ceased to be eligible to use IMF resources, if there was a 
suspension of payments under a standby or non-observance of performance 
criteria in a standby, or if a standby ceased to be in effect. This IMF default 
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would be common in emerging country loans, but not in the case of advanced 
countries. 
XXV 
ACCELERATION 
If an event of default occurred, the agreement stated that the agent bank 
could immediately accelerate outstanding loans plus accrued interest and cancel 
the commitments of the banks to make further loans. There was typically no 
provision for merely putting loans on demand in order to raise the temperature. 
But sometimes, the agent had discretion without taking a majority bank vote. 
There was no such thing as a no-action clause of the type found in bond 
trustees, where the trustee had the sole right to take proceedings. Once a 
payment was missed, any bank could take whatever proceedings it liked to 
recover that payment, although acceleration required a majority vote. 
XXVI 
AGENT BANK CLAUSES 
In a syndicated credit agreement, one of the banks is appointed as agent to 
the banks for administrative convenience of the loan. 
In the early days, the agency clause was short. It contained an appointment 
of the agent by the banks as the agent of the banks (not the borrower), 
provided that the agent bank had the powers and duties conferred by the 
agreement and contained various clauses excluding fiduciary and monitoring 
duties. It also gave the agent bank a right of indemnity against the banks. There 
was provision for removal of the agent bank by syndicate majority decision. 
Towards the end of the decade, primarily as a result of the UBAF/EABC 
litigation (see above), the agency clause was greatly extended, notably in the 
direction of protecting the agent against liabilities, such as suits by members of 
the syndicate on the ground, for example, that the agent had a conflict of 
interest or had not exercised due diligence in relation to the monitoring of the 
loan, that the agent or arranger should have spotted errors in the information 
memorandum, or that the agent should have notified an event of default known 
to it, and so on. For example, an “ostrich” clause was introduced that stated that 
the agent bank was not deemed to know of an event of default unless the 
personnel in its agency department had received a written notice stating the 
event and stating that it was an event of default. This reflected the increasing 
division of banks into departments. 
XXVII 
SYNDICATE DEMOCRACY 
The concept of syndicate democracy was well-entrenched in early 
documents. Votes were generally measured according to the amount of the 
banks’ participations (unused commitment plus principal outstandings). 
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Majorities were either fifty percent or sixty-six and two-thirds percent. There 
was no additional numerable requirement, for example, a majority of banks by 
number as well. 
Invariably, the powers vested in the majority banks were not nearly as 
extensive as those that might be vested in bondholders. The banks were 
sophisticated institutions with substantial commitments in the loan and 
generally unwilling to delegate management to a majority. Further, because of 
the club attitudes, there was usually no need to protect the general interest 
against a maverick creditor who might otherwise obstruct a beneficial 
arrangement, or so it was considered. 
The usual powers of majority included directing the agent bank to 
accelerate the loans and cancel the commitments following an event of default, 
waiving a breach of covenant, consenting to the relaxation of a covenant, and 
sometimes determining whether an adverse change in financial condition was 
material. 
However, the majority could not usually waive a condition precedent to the 
advance of loans, so that each bank could unilaterally suspend its obligations to 
advance new money if a condition precedent was not fulfilled. 
A majority could not extend maturities, reduce the amount of payments, 
change the interest rate or currency, increase or extend commitments, change 
obligors, or determine certain other matters. These were totally entrenched. 
XXVIII 
PRO RATA SHARING CLAUSE 
This clause provided in outline that if any bank receives a greater 
proportion of its share or payments, it must immediately pay the excess to the 
agent bank, who will redistribute to the banks pro rata and the paying bank is 
either subrogated to the claims of the other banks who are paid or will take a 
pro rata assignment of their claims. 
This clause was standard and was an equality clause designed to share 
individual receipts by one bank but not others, such as receipts by set-off, 
proceeds of litigation, individual guarantees, or direct payment by the borrower. 
The clause was specially favored in government loans because there is no 
mandatory pari passu treatment of creditors on sovereign bankruptcy and no 
fraudulent preference doctrines. Although in syndicated credits, each bank 
made its own separate loan, this desire for equality was at the heart of any 
common venture. 
The clause originated in U.S. practice and may have derived from the 
common occurrence that the main house bank of a corporate borrow often held 
the deposits of the borrower so that it would be privileged by a set-off on the 
insolvency of the borrower. 
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The clauses originally provided for equalizing assignments, subsequently 
changed to subrogation since assignments might have attracted a stamp duty in 
the United Kingdom. 
It was considered at the time that the clause would usually allow double-
dipping. For example, a bank that set off the loan against a deposit may not use 
up the whole of the deposit. Hence, the bank would acquire loans from the 
other banks and be in a position to set off again. In this way, the whole of a 
deposit could be used up. 
In the early days, judgment proceeds received by a bank that individually 
sued the borrower were not excluded from the duty to share. An exclusion was 
inserted after Morgan Guaranty attached Iranian shares in the German 
company Krupp during the Iranian crisis in 1979. 
The clause had mixed success. The main problem was the unwillingness of 
banks to share. Thus, the clause is one where the lawyers are commanded to 
compose the music, but when the band starts up, nobody wants to dance. 
The most celebrated instances were vain attempts by disappointed banks to 
persuade their colleagues to share when American banks set off Iranian loans 
against deposits at the time of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and when 
Argentina paid all but the British banks during the Falklands crisis in the early 
1980s. 
It is possible that the sharing clause contributed to creditor stability and 
weakened the power of hold-out creditors during the LDC debt crisis of the 
1980s. However, the fact that by then, many of the loans contained a provision 
that excluded a duty of a bank to share judgment proceeds weakened this 
inertia effect. 
In the resolution of the 1980s debt crisis, the pro rata sharing clause often 
gave rise to acute problems. For example, when the debtor sovereign nation 
wished to arrange for an exchange of debt into a local currency that would be 
used to invest in local companies, this technically sparked off the pro rata 
sharing clause. The same problem arose in relation to the issue of Brady bonds 
in the late 1980s. 
XXIX 
ASSIGNMENTS AND TRANSFERS 
A clause typically provided that the borrower could not transfer any of its 
obligations or assign any of its rights, but the banks could assign all or any of 
their rights or change their lending offices. There were typically no prohibitions 
on sub-participations. 
Commonly, it was stated that a bank could not transfer without the consent 
of the borrower if the borrower’s liabilities were increased under an increased 
cost clause, but not under a tax grossing-up clause (since taxes could be 
controlled by the sovereign borrower itself). 
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The emphasis upon the importance of transferability first surfaced around 
1975, but the innovation of novation certificates appeared for the first time 
(apparently) in a loan agreement dated May 25, 1984, for a U.S. $500 million 
loan facility for Ireland led by Citicorp International Bank Ltd. The concept 
really took hold during and after the LDC debt crisis when banks needed the 
ability to be able to transfer their lending commitments and to get out of the 
situation, sometimes by selling the loans to distressed debt funds, popularly 
known as vulture funds. 
Later, capital adequacy rules were introduced by the Basel Committee, 
which required a clean transfer, including the transfer of obligations to lend. 
Since most of the loans were single draw-down and not revolving credits, the 
inability at the time to be able to transfer obligations to lend was not important. 
XXX 
BOILERPLATE 
The agreements contained typical boilerplate clauses, which continue to be 
found in these documents, including for example: 
1. A provision permitting banks to set off the loans against any other 
obligation owed by the bank to the borrower. 
2. A provision that waivers were limited specifically to their terms and 
that the remedies of the banks were cumulative and not exclusive of 
those provided in the agreement. 
3. A provision of doubtful efficacy providing that if the borrower’s 
payments were converted into a non-contractual currency, for 
example, by a judgment of a court, the borrower would pay extra to 
ensure that the bank concerned received the full amount in the 
contractual currency. 
4. A default indemnity providing that the borrower would pay losses 
including breakage costs resulting from the occurrence of an event of 
default or acceleration, a non-borrowing after request, or in various 
other cases. Thus, if the borrower or guarantor paid in a mid-interest 
period, a bank could suffer a loss on account of funds borrowed 
because the rate at which it could re-lend the returned funds might be 
less than the rate it was paying on the deposit it borrowed in the 
market to fund the loan. 
XXXI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions to be drawn from this review are as follows: 
1. The overall architecture and contents of the main clauses of 
sovereign syndicated credit agreements were settled early on in the 
1970s. Although there have been an enormous number of detailed 
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refinements, the fundamental foundations of the documents have not 
changed very significantly. 
2. Most of the refinements that have been added have been designed 
to meet specific situations. Each crisis tended to give rise to an 
addition to the document. 
3. Documents are not a legal wand to conjure up the treasure at the 
end of the rainbow in the event of a default by a sovereign borrower. 
Nevertheless, on the whole, the documents stood up and did what they 
were supposed to do. 
4. The fact that many of the clauses were not actually used during the 
sovereign debt crisis in the 1980s led some banks to question whether 
the documents had any use at all and whether it would have been just 
fine to have lent on the basis of a few promissory notes or even a 
handshake. It must be admitted that some clauses were more habit-
forming than useful, for example, market disruption clauses and 
illegality clauses. On the whole, we think that the bargaining position 
between debtors and creditors would have been very different if, for 
example, sovereign debtors had the benefit of their own governing 
law, which would thereby have enabled them to impose a legally 
binding moratorium by their own legislation. In any game of cards, the 
quality of cards does count, sometimes only a little, but sometimes a 
lot. 
 
